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Abstract 
On August 6, 2019, the 119 members of the School of criminal justice, forensic science and 
criminology at the University of Lausanne were the target of an online scammer. His/her 
modus operandi consisted of email masquerading as the Director of the School in an attempt 
to induce the victims to buy digital gift cards and to transmit the card usage code to the 
perpetrator. 
The first author of this paper is the Director of the School, and the second is an expert in 
digital forensic science and a professor of the School. They worked together in real time to 
deal with the fraud. Because the fraud occurred in a School of forensic science and 
criminology, it raised many questions on a variety of overlapping dimensions. The objective 
of this study was, therefore, to draw lessons from this case from several perspectives ranging 
from forensic science to cybersecurity, and from practical to academic. 
The response to the incident has been treated in four typical distinguishable phases: (1) fraud 
detection; (2) crisis management; (3) post-incident analysis; and (4) reporting to different 
communities. 
We conclude this paper by taking lessons from the case to express the essential role of 
forensic knowledge and crime analysis in interpreting the information conveyed by digital 
traces to develop innovative cross-disciplinary models for preventing, detecting, analysing, 
investigating and responding to online fraud. 
Keywords: online scam; crime analysis; digital forensics; routine activities; digitalization.  
  
1. Introduction 
Recently, the volume and variety of online frauds have been more clearly expressed through 
official crime statistics and surveys (BCS, 2016; Reep-van den Bergh & Junger, 2018). They 
describe the emergence of a new wave of crime or "cyber-volume crimes", perceptible to the 
public, which requires a rapid and structured response. By whom and how it should be 
organised between public and private stakeholders remains unclear, however (Dupont, 2017; 
Loveday, 2018).  
Several professional and academic communities are developing integrative models for dealing 
with cybersecurity and potentially covering the issue. Their aim is to ensure better protection 
and resilience of infrastructures, as well as an effective response to computer security 
incidents, whether at individual, organisational or even national levels (Cichonski, Millar, 
TimGrance, & Scarfone, 2012; CMM, 2016; NIST, 2018). They mainly adopt a technical and 
information technology risk management vision, but also incorporate legal or social aspects 
intrinsic to these problems. The inclusion of forensic science within incident response 
practices was also considered early in these models (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006). 
At the same time, a "digital forensics" community was emerging, supporting the detection, 
collection and management of digital evidence in judicial processes (Pollitt, 2010). Beyond 
this traditional scope of forensic science, a forensic analysis approach has also proven to be 
essential to decipher the modus operandi of the attackers, and thus gather the knowledge to 
better protect an infrastructure (Casey & Nikkel, 2020). Cybersecurity and digital forensics 
are now routinely implemented as specialized departments in private and public organizations 
or as services. Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) is considered to be a sub-
domain, which is involved in particular when a rapid response to incidents is required.  
However, these developments are predominately technical and are primarily focused on high-
profile cases such as major crimes, state-sponsored cyberattacks, and theft of large amounts of 
money or personal information. Although DFIR processes, practices, and tools play an 
important role in dealing with cybercrime, they are not sufficient for dealing with new forms 
of high volume crimes enabled by the technological infrastructures that have become 
ubiquitous in everyday life (Loveday, 2018). A wide variety of online frauds are among these 
crimes that have become part of a digitally transformed society in which human factors play 
the central role. The coronavirus has shown how suddenly new online modus operandi can 
appear when the social context changes and people's routine activities are disrupted1. Online 
fraud is therefore difficult to model and mitigate entirely using a DFIR approach. It is 
preferable to integrate a strong crime analysis component bringing new insights from 
criminology. A new stream of criminological research is attempting to better delimit the size 
of the problem and its forms (M. Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009; Reep-van den Bergh & 
Junger, 2018), to adapt existing theories in an attempt to explain them (Eric Rutger Leukfeldt 
& Yar, 2016), to characterize the phenomenon more specifically (E. Rutger Leukfeldt, 
Kleemans, & Stol, 2017; Wall, 2010), study it from the victim's perspective (Mark Button, 
Lewis, & Tapley, 2014; Mark Button, Nicholls, Kerr, & Owen, 2014; Cross, 2018; Whitty, 
2019) or consider the kinds of possible responses (Holt & Bossler, 2016).  
From a practical perspective, the police, in particular, are expected to respond in a 
professional manner to an increasing number of solicitations from the victims of these frauds. 
This is not only about creating new specialized structures. The whole organization has to 
adapt, from the field officers in charge of receiving complaints and communicating with the 
public, to a more central, specialized or managerial level (Loveday, 2018). New partnerships 
need to be created. Forensic science and crime analysis, both as disciplines and as structures, 
must also find their place in these changes (Rossy & Ribaux, 2020).  
A practical case concretizes remaining challenges in combining different views and approach 
to online fraud, both from an R&D and a practical point of view. On August 6, 2019, 
members of the School of Criminal Justice at University of Lausanne, were the target of an 
online fraud consisting of email masquerading as the Director in order to obtain money from 
them in the form of digital gift cards. Both authors of this paper were directly concerned by 
the fraud. The first being the Director of the school, and the second as a professor of digital 
forensic science. They both worked together to deal with this fraud in real time.   
                                                 
1
 https://www.cyberthreatcoalition.org/ (accessed 2nd of April, 2020) 
 
This case-study is decomposed in four chapters, by similarity with typical incident response 
methodologies (Cichonski et al., 2012): (1) fraud detection; (2) crisis management; and (3) 
post-incident analysis and (4) reporting to communities. Lessons learned from this case are 
eventually integrated into a broader discussion of the central role of forensic science and 
crime analysis in dealing with online frauds.  
2. The detection 
On August 6, 2019, the Director of the School of Criminal Justice (SCJ) at University of 
Lausanne was on holidays. It was a rainy day. A perfect day to work from the hotel on a paper 
in preparation. The mailbox was open on the computer, letting incoming mail through, mostly 
mixing spams with messages relevant to the organization (several dozen). 
When scanning the emails quickly, one of them seemed unusual (message #1 - figure 1). This 
email was sent by a new employee of the School, who we will call Y for the rest of this article. 
It was the first sign that something was wrong. However, it did not trigger any action at that 
time. It just caused some surprise. 
Time: 12:39 pm 
A little later, a second sign was perceived by the Director, through an email from a colleague, 
displaying his availability, but asking if his identity was not usurped (message #2 - figure 2).  
Time: 12:45 pm 
 Figure 1: First email received (message #1). It was an order for an iTunes card, for CHF 200 (approx. US$ 200). The 
sender of the email is a doctoral student from the School. In fact, this doctoral student (Y) had just arrived at the School. Her 
name had not yet been memorized by the Director. Without any context, the email went unnoticed in the daily flow of emails. 
Note that the email was sent to two different addresses: one on a Gmail address, and the other one at unil.ch, which is the 
institutional domain name. 
 
Figure 2: Second email received (message #2). “Hello Olivier I'm back from lunch around 1:15 pm, and available. That's 
you "olivierribaux04@gmail.com" (see sender below), or someone is trying to use your identity? Best regards”. Colleagues 
were supposed to know that the Director was on vacation. Note that the message transmitted ("Hello are you available?") is 
in English whereas the common language of communication between the members of the School is French. 
Almost at the same time, the second author of this paper sent a WhatsApp message to the 
Director: “Hello, did you get hacked into your Gmail account?”.  In fact, he had also received 
the message "Hello, you are available?" from the same wrong address. Another colleague then 
phoned the manager to inform him that he had received a strange "Are you available?" 
message. He replied, but felt uncomfortable.  
Without any delay, the Director responded to message #2 (first colleague) to indicate that a 
fraud was probably in progress at the school, warning his colleague not to continue the 
dialogue with the sender of the email.  
From these signs, it became clear that a fraud was now underway. The perpetrator(s)2 of the 
fraud was claiming to be the Director in order to convince the employees to enter into his 
scenario. Beyond the fraud itself, it was emotionally difficult for the Director to imagine 
someone impersonating him and taking his position to demand a service from members of the 
School. He was therefore determined to take urgent action. 
Time: 12:48 pm 
3. The management of the crisis 
Although not a crisis management specialist, the Director adopted a usual structured approach 
in two steps: (1) assess the situation, and (2) consider urgent measures to mitigate the 
immediate development and impact of the fraud. When assessing the situation, it is necessary 
to identify the appropriate structures and people to be activated, according to their 
competencies (both as an authority and skills). Immediately five possibilities presented 
themselves:  
1. The police 
2. The University IT department 
3. Google (because of Gmail) 
4. Create an ad hoc crisis unit with the Colleague, who communicated remotely via 
WhatsApp 
5. Mobilize other members of the School 
Immediately, the fourth solution imposed itself in the immediate situation: the police and 
Google were perceived as difficult to mobilize to deal with such an event in real time; before 
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 The hypothesis of a single fraudster or of a group of fraudsters is discussed below. In order to avoid 
overloading the text before, we will use the singular form, letting tacitly the hypothesis of several perpetrators 
open.  
alerting the university, it was decided to observe the evolution of fraud. In the end, it was not 
considered reasonable to mobilize more people from the School during the holidays. 
This was not an ideal setting for an ad hoc crisis management, as both were on holidays 
distant from each other. One of them was visiting a tourist site with his family.  
The Director then entered into an intensive exchange of WhatsApp messages with his 
Colleague, the forensic expert. Two different perceptions of what was happening emerged 
from this discussion: 
Hypothesis A: the fraud targets were all contacts of the Director, obtained in an unknown 
manner. 
Hypothesis B: the fraud only targets SCJ employees whose addresses were obtained in an 
unknown manner. 
Hypothesis A was favored by the forensic expert. During his career, he was repeatedly 
confronted with the type of fraud called "emergency scam" or "crying for help scam". In this 
typical type of fraud, a person's email contacts are stolen by various means and they are used 
to request assistance under many pretexts, in order to obtain something of monetary value.  
Hypothesis B was preferred by the Director. He might be biased, because Hypothesis A 
would mean that his email account or computer was hacked and that all his contacts were 
stolen, which would have more serious ramifications for him and the university.  
If Hypothesis A was true, the Director should immediately enable two-factor authentication 
on all of his online accounts, inform his contacts of possible fraud, and contact his bank and 
government to check for any suspicious activity. These would be the minimum precautions he 
should take, and further actions could be necessary if the possible exposure was his computer 
or if there were subsequent indications of identity theft. 
If Hypothesis B was true, the circle of possible targets was much easier to define and reach. 
At the same time, an institutional list of targets was more likely to have been obtained by 
some other means than by hacking an email account or computer. As the fraud seemed to 
have progressed gradually, a key success factor under this hypothesis was the speed of the 
incident response.   
It was then that the Director decided to act by informing all the employees of the School 
(message #3 - figure 3). 
Time: 12:57 pm 
  
Figure 3: The email sent to all the employees of the School (message #3). “Dear all, there is currently an attempt to use my 
name with a Gmail address to contact you. I did not send this message. We are trying to find out where it came from”.  
This post created the progressive reaction of many members who provided information to the 
Director by email, or by other means of communication. One of them sent the following 
interesting message to the Director, bringing new information on the modus operandi. It was 
also a sign that some colleagues were currently responding to the initial message "Hello are 
you available?" (message #4 - figure 4).  
In this message, two aspects mitigated the impact of the fraudster's message: the French used 
contained small mistakes. In addition, generally French uses either the polite form "vous" 
(you) or the more familiar form "tu". Here, the fraudster used the polite form, while among 
colleagues, the "tu" is generally preferred. Moreover, a time difference was apparent. The first 
message was supposed to have been sent at 12:26 p.m., while the colleague's response is 
traced at 11:51 a.m. There are many possible explanations about the time indicated in 
forwarded emails, but this discrepancy might be explained by a timezone difference between 
the place from where the perpetrator is acting and the place where the recipients are located.   
It also appeared from the series of message received by the Director, that members of the 
School did not receive the messages at the same time: the fraudster did not send the messages 
all at once. 
 Figure 4: Thread of a conversation with the fraudster (message #4). We translate. The Colleague: ‘I am in Bern, but 
reachable’. The fraudster: “I'm in a meeting right now and that's why I’m contacting you through here. I should have called 
you but phone is not allowed to be used during the meeting. I don't know when the meeting will be rounding off and I want 
you to help me out on something very important right away.” Note the time difference of one hour between the sender and the 
receiver.  
It was at this point that the connection with message #1 made sense. Indeed, from this 
moment, the modus operandi became much clearer:  
• Many members of the School have received the ‘Hello are you available?’ message; 
• The perpetrator gradually sends messages, with a low degree of computerization and 
relatively poor French;  
• The fraudster enters into a real-time discussion with their targets, pretending to be at a 
meeting preventing any other form of communication than email. He is asking for 
urgent help to get iTunes cards (see figure 1); 
• At least one doctoral student (Y) has fallen into the trap of buying such cards; 
• Due to time difference traced in the emails, there are signs that the perpetrator is 
located in another country.  
A specific message was sent to Y who had just realized that she had been the victim of the 
scam. 
Time: 01:15 pm 
The Director then decided that it was time to alert the IT department of the University to the 
current situation, at least by an email to the helpdesk (this is how staff are required to 
communicate with the department). The sender of such an email immediately receives an 
automatic reply, certifying that the request will be taken into account. The message contains a 
ticket number. In our situation, this kind of response was very frustrating because time was 
critical for the immediate handling of the fraud. The Director tried to call the IT department 
but was unsuccessful, the employee insisting that he forwarded the request and rejecting the 
idea of creating a link with the person in charge. 
Time: 01:37 pm 
At the same time, remote WhatsApp exchanges continued within the small crisis unit 
composed of the forensic expert and the Director. Hypothesis A continued to be confronted 
with Hypothesis B. The balance, however, tilted towards Hypothesis B, knowing that only 
members of the School had so far shown signs of having received the "Hello are you 
available?" message. However, the Director checked Hypothesis A in more depth by asking 
others in his email contacts if they had also received the message. As it was the holidays, he 
only received one negative response, three hours later.   
The Director then attempted, by email, to inform an investigation service of the police 
specializing in the fight against cybercrimes. He has frequent contacts for research with this 
department. 
Time: 01:58 pm 
A little later, the IT department of the University eventually provided an answer with the 
following content (translated from French):  
“Following your message, our team produced a script to intercept any mail sent to the "false" 
address.” 
We learned later that the script was already implemented at 1:44 p.m., seven minutes after 
receiving the Director's message. This action considerably limited the possibilities for the 
fraudster to continue to deploy his/her fraud. The IT department then collected all the emails 
that were sent to the fraudster and warned the people concerned not to interact with him. 
Time: 02:26 pm. 
The next hour and a half was mainly devoted to: 
• responding to the numerous messages sent by members of the School about the fraud; 
• attempting to obtain the IP address of the fraudster’s computer by trapping a message 
sent to him/her. This was before anyone knew that the IT department had redirected 
the messages sent to the fraudster from the School. Indeed, this specific trapped 
message was read by the IT department, providing a location of the IP number on the 
Campus. This misdirection created some confusion about a possible intervention on 
the Campus! 
• continuing to weigh Hypothesis A versus B.  The police cybercrime department 
eventually provided advice along the same lines as Hypothesis A (the same as the 
forensic expert). However, further inquiries and evaluation of available information 
made it clear that Hypothesis A had to be rejected in favour of Hypothesis B; 
• discussing new information from the Computer Science Department, which 
mentioned that other departments of the University had been similarly victimized.  
The fraud was finally considered to be over. At 03:58 p.m., a new message was sent to all 
employees of the School, mentioning the reality of the fraud and the measures that had been 
taken to secure the environment.  
4. The post-incident analysis  
A post-incident analysis was considered essential:  
1. Meet with Y to address the potential psychological and financial impact of being 
victimized by fraud (message #1); 
2. Determine if other members of the School were affected by the fraud. It was obviously 
very delicate, due to privacy and the fact that potential victims would not want to let it 
be known; 
3. Learn more about the modus operandi, the extent of the fraud and the perpetrators 
would help assess the need to report the matter to the police for prosecution; 
4. The School, as an organization, must constantly analyze its vulnerabilities and the 
effectiveness of its responses to incidents. Since the fraud may have concerned the 
whole University (and beyond), such an analysis would also be of interest beyond the 
School’s structure; 
5. The School shall deploy intensive research on crime transformations and how to 
situate the role of criminology and forensic science in their study and treatment. Such 
a case would also constitute relevant teaching material. 
4.1. Method 
During the two weeks following the fraud, six lines of actions were chosen to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the fraud and associated crime phenomenon and victimology:  
1. It was decided to interview Y, in order to discuss the whole thread of the discussion 
with the aggressor, and address the potential psychological and financial impact on her; 
2. An anonymous survey was quickly organized inside the school (one week later) to 
assess the number of people who received the message "Hello are you available?", 
when they received the email, if they have been victimized, if a category of employees 
has been specifically targeted, in what order. The response rate was 66% (N = 76); 
3. Open source forensic data was analyzed to learn more about the modus operandi, 
trying to locate the offender(s), and to determine if the case was worth reporting;  
4. A literature and open sources research was carried out to discover if similar modus 
operandi were already known, in which context and what kind of interpretations was 
available; 
5. A meeting with the IT department was organized to discuss the fraud, its evolution, its 
interaction with the department during the event, to examine other available traces and 
possible future actions. 
Due to the lack of time, resources and knowledge, it is not claimed that all of these 
dimensions have been dealt with in a sufficiently structured and comprehensive manner. 
However, they each illuminated different aspects of the problem which helped clarify its 
interpretation. 
4.2. Results 
The main result for the School that emerged from this analysis is that no one seems to have 
been ultimately victimized. Even Y, once informed of the fraud, finally succeeded in 
canceling the order. 
The specific mechanisms of the fraud was investigated. They were mainly based on the traces, 
and email exchanges collected from the members of the School.  
4.2.1. Pattern of activity 
If the perpetrator had not obtained the email addresses of a member of the School, how did he 
proceed? The hypothesis that he or she visited the institutional site was naturally formulated. 
This website offers access to the individual page of each member of the School, containing 
the profile of each employee, including their email address, as well as their position. Another 
page describes the structure of the School with the name of its Director, its vice-directors, and 
administrative staff.  
If the fraudster had visited these pages, then traces of such accesses should be detectable. 
Google analysis tools were installed on the pages concerned and could provide indications. 
However, the site of the School is usually accessed frequently. The feasibility of 
distinguishing the traces left by the crooks from those left by the usual accesses to the site was 
questionable. It is an elementary reasoning in forensic science. If a systematic scan of the 
page of each member of the School had taken place, this should be visible in the traces 
detected by the Google tool. 
The result was particularly convincing. A clear pattern emerged. It indicated that something 
unusual happened at the site on August 6 and that vibrations had already occurred the day 
before (figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Pattern of the activity. View of the number of individual pages "seen" (accessed) per day on the School's 
institutional site, a generated by "Google analytics". Beyond the obvious relevance of the pattern, the detailed concept of 
"pages seen" belongs to the google tool and should be understood as a third definition which is not entirely transparent to 
the authors of this article. An intuitive definition was, however, sufficient for the purpose. 
Finally, some indications on the origin of the fraud were also sought: many accesses to the 
site were traced by the Google analysis tool, pointing to Lagos, in Nigeria. These traces find 
no reasonable explanation other than the preparation and execution of the fraud. Why would a 
systematic access to all pages of the School's members from Lagos have occurred on that date 
and some of them the day before? The School has no specific agreement or collaborations 
with Nigeria. An access to the administrative page was also noticed in these traces.  
According to the survey, all respondents reported receiving the first "Hello are you 
available?" email, and each at a different time. It was a strong confirmation that the fraudster 
had sent the messages one by one. From the more complete data processed by the IT 
department, it became clear that the fraudster sent from zero to four emails per minute (see 
also figure 6), by accessing the institutional page of each member of the School. This pace 
seemed to depend on the interactions he or she had with the people responding to their 
messages. The fraudster was then probably alone and doing the work by hand. In the 
exchanges of collected emails, it was clear that a time difference of one hour appeared 
systematically. This is exactly the time difference between Switzerland and Nigeria. 
4.2.2. Specific thread 
By studying specific threads of exchange, some interesting patterns emerged. Here is the 
thread concerning Y: 
Fraudster(11:58 am): “Hello are you available”.  
Y (all the rest of conversation was in French , we translate – 12:00 pm): “Is it Prof. Ribaux? I don't recognize this email”.  
Fraudster (in French – 12:03 pm): “It is my personal email. I'm in a meeting right now and that's why I’m contacting you 
through here. I should have called you but phone is not allowed to be used during the meeting. I don't know when the 
meeting will be rounding off and I want you to help me out on something very important right away”. 
Y (in French – 12:06 pm): “Yes, of course. Today I was working from home but if you need I can come to the university 
in the afternoon without any problem. We can make an appointment for later if you wish. What do you think about it?” 
Fraudster (in French – 12:12 pm): “ You don't have to come to university. You have to help me get iTunes gift cards from 
the store and send them to me here, I'll pay you back, I'll have to send them to someone as soon as possible. » 
Y– 12:16 pm): “Yes, of course, I can do it without any problem. Can you give me more details about this (amount, name 
of the recipient, etc.). - I have to put these details on the order.” 
Fraudster (12:24 pm): “I need you to get an iTunes card for CHF 200 and send it to al****ta@gmail.com”as the recipient. 
Thank you.” 
Fraudster (12:36 pm): “She wants physical ID cards from the store.” 
Fraudster (12:42 pm): “When you have them, scratch them, take pictures of the cards and attach them to this email, then 
send them to me here or to his email, okay.” 
Y (12:45 pm): “Isn't it the same as buying online? I'm sure you receive a code with which you can access it. Otherwise I 
can go to the store but it seems to me that it is the same process.” 
Fraudster (12:50 pm): “Go to the store and get a physical iTunes card. It can be 100 CHF in 2 pieces.” 
Fraudster (12:54 pm) “When you receive them, scratch them, take pictures of the cards and attach them to this email, then 
send them to me here or to al****ta@gmail.com.” 
Fraudster (01:19 pm): “Do you have the cards? I’m waiting for the cards” 
Eventually at 01:39 pm, Y sent message 1 (figure 1) attesting that she had bought the cards, but online.  
During the conversation, the fraudster showed some impatience. For unknown reasons, he/she 
insisted on receiving photos from the code of a real card, to be sent to another address 
(al****ta@gmail.com), rather than the code from an online order. This created confusion. 
The tone of the fraudster seems more and more imperative and authoritarian. 
Another interesting aspect emerged from the collection of threads: when the first answer was 
in English, the rest of the conversation continued in English. When the first answer was in 
French, it continued in French. As a test, the first message was translated with "Google 
translation" (table 1). If this tool was actually used by the perpetrator, this could have 
important consequences on the extent of the fraud, as will be discussed below. 
English Automatic translation in French 
I'm in a meeting right now and that's why I’m contacting 
you through here. I should have called you but phone is not 
allowed to be used during the meeting. I don't know when 
the meeting will be rounding off and I want you to help me 
out on something very important right away 
Je suis en réunion en ce moment et c’est pourquoi je vous 
contacte ici. J'aurais dû vous appeler, mais le téléphone 
n'est pas autorisé pendant la réunion. Je ne sais pas quand 
la réunion s'achèvera et je veux que vous m'aidiez 
immédiatement sur quelque chose de très important 
Table 1: the text translated from English to French through the online available tool ‘Google translation’3 is exactly the text 
sent by the fraudster when the first answer of the message was in French. It contains some minor mistakes in French.  
4.2.3. Other data available on the fraud  
The university's IT department informed us that other departments had also been affected 
before the school was. Subsequently, emails coming from other departments and further 
exchanges of information with the IT department showed that certain departments have been 
affected also after the School was.   
Based on the survey, we were able to confirm that some members of the School responded to 
the first "Hello are you available?" message. Few of them continued the conversation, as they 
detected the fraud early on. This was confirmed by the IT department. Finally, on the basis of 
their data, they could determine that each member (except the Director) received the “Hello 
are you available?”. The profile of the person who have answered the first emails distributed 
in:  
• A new employee; 
• Researchers who do not speak French, and are using English at the School; 
• Professors having a strong daily interaction with the Director.  
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 Translated the 22th of September 2019, through https://translate.google.be/ 
In addition, we were able to compare the number of people from the School who responded 
with the number of people from another department who responded to the fraudster (the name 
of this department is unknown to us) (table 2):  
 Shool of Criminal 
Justice 
Other department 
Number of members having received the « Hello 
are you available?” message 
118 19 
Number of people who responded to the first 
message 
7  (6%) 15 (79 %) 
More than two exchanges 2 (1,7 %) 4 (21 %) 
Date and duration August 6, 2019,  
1:53 – 15:38 
(3h 45 mn) 
August 26, 2019 
16:23 - 18:16 
(1h 53 mn) 
Table 2: another department had also been targeted by the fraudster 20 days later, with the same modus operandi. The size 
of the department was much smaller, but the modus operandi seems to have had a greater impact. 
This fraud is very global. On the Internet, it is very easy to find examples of many 
institutional websites and IT departments of Universities, preeminently in North America, 
warning against such fraudulent activities throughout 2019.  These reports show how the 
fraud has been persistent for at least one year. Bernstein (Bernstein, 2019) also discusses 
some of the author's limitations regarding the language used, which is not meant to fit the 
style of an academic administrator. Beyond this, in a subsequent presentation (Perrig, 2019), 
it was learned that one of the most advanced laboratories in cybersecurity in the country had 
also been the target of the fraud, at the beginning of the year: 25% of the members of the 
department immediately rushed to the boss's office in reaction to the message "Hello are you 
available?". Eventually, a description of the fraud was found in the “Chronicle of higher 
Education” 4. This article highlights how expectations, desires and pressure on researchers can 
create a breeding ground for such frauds in universities.  
4.2.4. Synthesis of the modus operandi and victim profiles 
                                                 
4
 https://www.chronicle.com/article/Phishing-Scheme-Targets/245535, January 23, 2019, The chronicle of 
higher education. 
This analysis leads to assume:  
• It is a global fraud, but it is specifically targeted at university departments; 
• The perpetrator (alone), based in Lagos (NG), studied the structure of the ESC through 
the institutional site; 
• He or she systematically sent the message "Hello are you available?", in order of 
appearance on the site. It took approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes to reach all 
members of the School; 
• He or she was reactive, responding in the target language, using Google translation if 
necessary; 
• He or she wanted to get codes for iTunes gift cards; 
• He had estimated the reasonable amount to ask for CHF 200 (about 200 US$); 
• He or she used progressively more authoritarian language; 
• He or she planned to use a different address to manage the stolen codes. The 
monetization strategy remains unknown, however; 
• The fraud had an impact on new employees and foreign doctoral students, who did not 
know the usual communication styles used. Also, professors who have a high degree 
of operational relationship with the Director. 
The success of the fraud is strongly based on social engineering. It can be considered a priori 
as a fraud that is not really based on technology. However, it should be noted that everything 
relies on complex technological infrastructures fully integrated into daily life, and having 
radically changed the modes of communication and opened new opportunities for fraudsters. 
In addition, the possible use of an automatic translator, and therefore of artificial intelligence, 
has changed everything on the scale and the global potential of this fraud. Fraud was on the 
one hand very targeted (University departments), but, on the other hand, probably globalized 
on a very large scale through machine translation (see section 4.2.2.). 
5. Lessons learned, reporting and possible plans of action 
This case has the potential to raise many general questions about how high-volume online 
frauds are handled by professions, and studied by academia.  
Several positions have been adopted here by the Director and the forensic expert having dealt 
with the case:  
• as a manager, the Director felt responsible for what was going on; the fact that an 
unknown person tried to impersonate him to extract money from his colleagues 
worked as a powerful driver of this feelings; 
• a manager is also concerned with the organization of the security of the establishment, 
in particular with the way in which it is protected against standard fraud and by its 
resilience in the event of a cyber-attack. The lessons learned from this situation are 
therefore of the greatest interest from this point of view; 
• their experience in computer science, crime analysis and digital forensic science with 
police practice clearly guided their understanding of the situation and their reaction; 
• they are, as researchers, particularly interested in the transformations of crimes by 
digitalization, and about the role of digital forensic science. 
This fraud does not correspond to a high-level technological crime. Rather it belongs to these 
volume cyber-crimes that insert into daily life and routine activities (Felson & Boba, 2010). 
There is no existing "profession" that would adequately prepare for both the handling of this 
case in real-time, and for supporting its overall interpretation. This was made very concrete by 
the ad hoc manner in which the fraud was detected, the institutional vacuum that was faced 
during the management of the crisis, and the post-analysis of the specific fraud, which was 
poorly treated in the scientific literature across disciplines.  
This discussion is structured along four dimensions: (1) what worked and what did not work 
both in the detection and handling of the case, (2) general consideration about how this case 
can be situated in current research about online frauds, and (3) what was reported from the 
case and more global action taken, and (4) the role of forensic science.  
5.1. The detection and the response to the situation 
The timeline (figure 6) shows the progress of the fraud, its detection and the measures that 
have been taken. The fraud was detected when about 40% of the School's members had 
already received the message "Hello are you available?".  
5.1.1. The detection and first measures 
By a closer reading of the message from Y (message #1), the detection time could have been 
shorter. 
 Figure 6: Progress of the fraud and measures taken. A timeline showing the incoming flow of the "Hello are you 
available?" message that has been systematically sent to each member of the School. Fraud detection and actions taken are 
mentioned.  
This is a common problem in serial crime analysis: the detection of a previously unknown 
problem takes time, even when the relevant data are already available and systematically 
monitored (Grossrieder & Ribaux, 2019). In this particular case, the filtering system set up by 
the IT department did not detect the fraud and the anti-spam measures were ineffective. The 
early reaction of some colleagues triggered the detection, demonstrating a certain level of 
awareness within the organization. Once the problem was detected, retrospective analysis 
showed that it was already active before, and the readiness to recognize a future occurrence 
became much greater. This is also a very common mechanism in crime analysis.  
The time elapsed since the message to all the employees was sent (12 minutes after the fraud 
was detected), could have been shorter. At that time, about half of the members of the School 
still had not received the message "Hello are you available?". Most people reacted very 
positively to this warning. The difficulty of immediately recognizing the specificities of fraud 
and its targeted nature (Hypothesis A, known modus operandi against Hypothesis B, unknown 
modus operandi) explains the reluctance to send the alert message earlier. If the precise 
modus operandi of the fraud had been known earlier, the elapsed time would have been 
shorter.  
The time that had elapsed since the University's IT department was alerted was also too long. 
For their part, the reaction time was very short. It only took, at lunch time, 7 minutes to 
implement a script to block outgoing mail. However, their accessibility in terms of tickets 
asking you to wait your turn is clearly not adequate in case of emergency. It is clear, however, 
that university IT departments are overwhelmed by the number of messages, of varying 
degrees of urgency, they receive. They must organize a request management system. Beyond, 
they are professionalizing their overall approach to cybersecurity, including incident response, 
and the monitoring of scams that reach and target universities. They are also seeking to raise 
the level of awareness in their organizations. However, there is a concern that their approach 
only draws on common-sense knowledge of criminology, intelligence and forensic science.    
5.2.2. Reporting and subsequent measures 
The knowledge gained through this case has obviously been of interest to the School, the 
University, and beyond that to all Swiss universities. There was no reason why the fraud 
should not spread further. As the modus operandi was known in detail, tailor-made prevention 
actions were relatively easy to determine.  
The case was reported through different channels with the aim of making knowledge 
available to take repressive or preventive measures to be taken at a strategical or operational 
level:  
• almost immediately, a presentation of the case was made in a meeting of all the 
responsible of IT security departments in universities; 
• several presentations were provided to the management of the University, as well as to 
many colleagues under different contexts; 
• an email prepared by the IT department was sent to all the departments one month 
later; as well as an article in the journal of the IT department 5 (four months later); 
• a presentation in the form of a debriefing was organized specifically for the members 
of the School three months later; 
• a presentation  was organized for middle managers of the police at a regional level; 
• a presentation is planned for the International Association of French-speaking Police 
Psychologists6.  
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Feedback received after such a dissemination indicate some impact of these measures. The 
debriefing at the School was obviously very impactive, because it was based on something 
vivid. This awareness raising initiative may even have exceeded a threshold of information 
saturation. This sensitization to the problem should significantly reduce the chances of 
successfully deploying similar online frauds in a near future. 
From the traces collected, which show a clear pattern of access to the institutional site, it 
would certainly have been possible to develop a more technological approach to automatically 
capture the first signs of future attempts. This was not considered, mainly for privacy reasons, 
and also on the basis of the amount of effort to be made in balance with a subjective 
assessment of the impact of the fraud and the effectiveness of the measure.   
The psychological impact of the fraud was not to be underestimated either. This point is much 
clearer in a new literature in criminology (Mark Button, Lewis, et al., 2014; Cross, 2018). 
Debriefing with those involved was considered a major objective. For the Director having 
been impersonated by the fraudster, the impact was not neutral at all.  
Prosecution was ultimately a key point to address. Was it worth reporting? Indeed, it was not 
so clear whether, from the point of view of the criminal code, it was actually a crime. There 
was evidence of preparation and some attempts to commit fraud. If the activity was 
considered a crime, it is then not clear that the preparation and attempts would have been 
considered a crime. In imagining the likely origin of the fraud (Nigeria), it would have been 
doubtful whether all the investigative efforts across jurisdictions had been carried out for 
activities that are hardly considered a crime, without anything of financial worth being stolen.  
Finally, digital traces available to the School were used extensively throughout the analysis or 
from a more investigative perspective. The evaluative strength of these available digital traces 
was low. However, if we consider the situation as a whole, this is a type of serial fraud and 
the perpetrators could act on a fairly large scale. There is a lack of knowledge to support the 
triage of online fraud activities between petty individual crimes and large-scale, organized 
serial crimes that are worthy of prosecution. Whatever these considerations, the case has been 
transmitted to the police to contribute to their experience investigating fraudulent activities, 
and presented to middle level managers for training purposes. 
6. Some more general considerations and the role of forensic science 
The handling of this specific case was satisfactory, given its scope, impact and low severity. 
Some would even say exaggerated. Whatever these opinions, it was clear that members of the 
School, specially the persons who had to directly respond to the incident, were frustrated by 
the absence of institutional and structured approaches for dealing with the case.  The response 
here was entirely constituted ad hoc. Whatever degree of structure is deemed reasonable to 
deal with such crimes, there is a long way to the current and usual structured treatment of 
typical high-volume crimes or the comprehensive and effective implementation of new 
incident-response methodologies in cybersecurity. In this area, institutions, professions and 
methods are not fully prepared to deal with such pervasive crimes. 
This case completely confirms opinions calling for more coordination and collaboration 
between private and public institutions, as well as the community in general. It is also a matter, 
especially for the police, of taking distance from systematic prosecutions, as a main objective 
(Dupont, 2017), in order to adopt instead more comprehensive intelligence-led approaches, 
implement crime analysis systems (Rossy & Ribaux, 2020), and develop knowledge about 
what works and what does not work in terms of prevention and repression. 
Many relevant academic works are now emerging, but within the typical silos of the 
disciplines. For example, cybersecurity is mainly considered at a technological level (CMM, 
2016); data scientists are promoting big data analysis (Grossrieder & Ribaux, 2019); 
psychologists and criminologists scrutinize the methods used by the fraudsters and their 
capacity for social engineering, the profile of the perpetrators, the vulnerability of the victims 
and the psychological impact of the fraud (Mark Button, Lewis, et al., 2014; Reep-van den 
Bergh & Junger, 2018; Whitty, 2019); criminologists focus on how to measure the 
phenomena (Reep-van den Bergh & Junger, 2018) or how these new frauds can be explained 
by existing theories and what are their mechanisms (E. Rutger Leukfeldt et al., 2017; Eric 
Rutger Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Wall, 2010); forensic scientists remain auxiliaries of the 
criminal justice system focused on the collection, evaluation and presentation of evidence 
(Pollitt, 2010); not to speak about the law community trying to define relevant judicial 
dimensions. All these works are highly relevant for interpreting parts of our case, and some 
might be relevant for designing a response. However, there is no cybersecurity methodology 
that integrates in a balanced way all of these factors for dealing with such concrete fraud 
campaign. There are many initiatives to advance interdisciplinary work in academia, but few 
successes in deriving practical methodologies for dealing with problems when and as they 
occur.  
In this context, what kind of viewpoint can be developed in the field of forensic science? 
Casey (2019) first mentions that forensic science and digital forensics should be much better 
integrated in order to develop a structured and robust forensic ecosystem to deal with the new 
situation. In particular, it is about developing harmonized methodologies for forensic 
preparedness, exploiting forensic intelligence, improving investigations, strengthening 
evaluation of evidence, and lightweight agile retrospectives to enable rapid improvements 
(Casey & Nikkel, 2020). Concepts have to be worked out in order to avoid re-inventing 
knowledge already developed for years in forensic science. Rather, they need to be adapted to 
take better account of new digital environments with a change of scale in the variety and 
volume of available traces, as well as new challenges in evaluating their probative strength 
(Pollitt, Casey, Jaquet-Chiffelle, & Gladyshev, 2018).   
Such a vision also allows for the integration of physical and digital traces to extract the 
information they convey about the many forms of crimes that have been transformed by 
digitalization, but still have a strong component in the real world (e.g. stolen goods sold on 
auction sites or illicit drugs sold on the darknet).  
Going further, the trace is considered by Boullier (2017) as the most elementary data 
generated by human activities which should constitute the main basis for studying 
sociological phenomena in a digitalized society. The study of traces (traceology) generated by 
unusual activities on different types of substrates (physical or electronic) can be combined 
with crime analysis and, more broadly, to certain theories in criminology, in order to 
constitute a focal point where methodologies dedicated to the study of and response to 
digitalized forms of crime should be discussed (Ribaux, 2019).   
Is it not obvious that much of the handling of the "Hello are you available?" fraud was based 
on traces generated by the activity of the perpetrator, even though there was ultimately no 
prosecution. 
6. Conclusion 
In the many cases where this type of fraud has appeared in the world, it probably did not 
trigger "crisis management", a coordinated response, and a lightweight agile retrospective. It 
is not considered important enough and gives the impression that everything is already known 
and that it is part of everyday life with no significant loss. It does not seem challenging in 
technical or forensic terms, because the modus operandi is heavily based on social 
engineering. It is up to the users of the Internet infrastructure to protect themselves. In any 
case, prosecution is still too difficult, slow or even impossible in such situations. It seems that 
we cannot do much more until legislation and cross-border evidence exchange has been 
harmonized and designed to make the investigative process more effective (Biasiotti, Mifsud 
Bonnici, Cannataci, & Turchi, 2018). 
A similar situation has occurred in the recent history of policing. Traditional high-volume 
property crimes that cross jurisdictions (e.g. burglaries or all sorts of thefts and frauds) were 
increasing dramatically during the eighties, and have required a strong reaction. It took a long 
time to gradually define new strategies and new policing style. The solutions found have been 
more proactive and intelligence-led (i.e., not prosecution-focused), incorporating crime 
analysis models based on crime concentrations, opportunities theories in criminology and the 
use of physical traces. Knowledge about what works and what does not work in terms of 
crime disruption or harm reduction has also increased considerably during this period 
(Ratcliffe, 2016; Ribaux, Walsh, & Margot, 2006). By analogy, we are now in the same 
situation with online frauds than in the past with traditional high-volume crimes. The 
difficulties in prosecuting globalized crimes should be an incentive to find alternative 
solutions in the same spirit. It is necessary to develop a new, well-balanced, interdisciplinary 
proactive vision integrating digital traces and their interpretation at the heart of the process 
(Rossy & Ribaux, 2020).  
We are far from this point. Larger institutions seem increasingly better equipped, both 
technologically and in terms of cybersecurity, to deal with such cases and protect themselves 
from cyberattack that endanger or cause harms to their activities.  However, what became 
clear in our case study was effectively that there was no comprehensive approach to policing 
online fraud, from data collection to the production of intelligence that would point the way to 
responses that are known to be efficient. Responsibilities are scattered into many structures 
and areas of competencies. The relevant expertise is focused on prosecution (the police) or 
cybersecurity (other stakeholders), and hard to mobilize for collective problem solving in 
today’s context.   
The common attitude of taking current organizational settings and professions as rigid silos 
should be abandoned. When confronted with real cases, the problem is the centre of interest, 
not a predefined structure or area of knowledge. From the problem, solutions, not restricted to 
prosecution or to technology, must be found in real time either by finding the best skills and 
tools in agile organizations. It was clear, in this case, that a generalist vision of forensic 
science, incorporating criminological knowledge, as well as a certain police practice were a 
solid basis for handling the case. In this sense, such a case study can pave the way toward 
approaches to policing online fraud fully integrating a reframed vision of forensic science 
around the study of the trace (traceology).  
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Highlights 
• A case study for deciphering the anatomy of a specific online fraud targeting a 
University Department 
• Emphasis on the scale of such frauds and on how they are pervasive 
• A concrete situation demonstrating why institutions may find it difficult to deal with 
such frauds, despite cybersecurity efforts. 
• Forensic science and traceology are pivotal, but not considered as such. 
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